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Child Labor: 
Since ﬁ rst exposed in the late 1990s in Pakistan3, child 
labor has been the deﬁ ning labor problem in the soccer 
ball industry. Among all labor rights violations, child labor 
attracts the most public attention and has been at the center 
of many sporting goods industry agreements pertaining to 
labor standards. Despite multi-stakeholder initiatives and 
various monitoring programs at the company and country-
wide levels, ILRF found that child labor continues to exist.  
Temporary Labor:
ILRF found that non-permanent workers are the standard 
for the hand-stitched soccer ball industry. In Pakistan, India 
and China, factories outsource the labor intensive stitching 
process to workers in stitching centers and in homes who 
work on a casual or temporary basis.  Th is kind of supply 
chain segmentation makes it diﬃ  cult to monitor the 
production process for labor rights compliance. 
Moreover, due to the prevalence of casual or temporary 
contracts, workers are subject to frequent and serious 
violations of their labor rights. Workers are often paid 
below the legal minimum wage and their incomes can 
barely cover basic needs. While they are vulnerable 
to occupational health hazards, their part-time status 
makes them ineligible for many social protections 
including health care. Th e rights to organize and bargain 
collectively are usually legally barred to workers with 
informal employment status. 
At one Pakistani manufacturer, ILRF researchers found 
that all interviewed stitching center or home-based workers 
were employed on a casual basis and almost all of them 
were paid below the legally required minimum wage. In the 
same manufacturer’s supply chain, workers spoke of gender-
based discrimination. Female home-based workers were 
paid the least and faced the possibility of losing their jobs 
permanently due to pregnancy. 
The 2010 World Cup presents a golden business opportunity for 
soccer ball companies. During the 2006 World Cup, Adidas’ revenue 
in the soccer category increased more than US $800 million. 
However, these business opportunities may come at the expense 
of workers in factories, stitching centers and homes globally to 
produce soccer balls. Over a decade ago, the world was shocked 
by reports that Pakistani children were stitching soccer balls for 
six cents an hour1. In response to the media frenzy and public 
outrage, companies, governments, and other stakeholders 
committed to eliminating child labor in the industry by 
supporting the 1997 Atlanta Agreement which aimed to end 
child labor within the soccer ball industry 2.
Thirteen years later, with the 2010 World Cup hosted by South 
Africa just around the corner, it is time to ask what, if any, 
improvements have been made for workers that produce the 
most important symbol of the game: the soccer ball. 
This report presents the key fi ndings of the International Labor Rights Forum’s research in the 
four largest soccer balls producing countries: Pakistan, India, China and Thailand.   This report 
also highlights the need to rethink the strategies being utilized by companies to encourage 
suppliers to adhere to strong labor standards.
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Working Conditions: 
A decade-long eﬀ ort which exclusively focused on child labor 
left fundamental issues such as low wages and unsatisfactory 
working conditions in the industry almost unaddressed.
In addition, this report presents an analysis of 
previous corporate social responsibility initiatives, 
namely the Independent Monitoring Association for 
Child Labor (IMAC) in Pakistan, the Sports Goods 
Foundation in India (SGFI), SA8000 certiﬁ cation, 
and the Fairtrade Labeling Organization certiﬁ cation 
system. ILRF points out that both IMAC and SGFI 
are facing issues of governance transparence, ﬁ nancial 
sustainability and human capacity. Th eir limited 
capability in terms of ﬁ nance and human capital makes 
it questionable whether they are capable of carrying out 
eﬀ ective monitoring activities especially beyond basic 
identiﬁ cation of cases of child labor. 
Th e companies that buy the soccer balls from 
manufacturers must also identify negative impacts on 
working conditions resulting from their own purchasing 
practices.  Companies should determine a strategy for 
developing a new way of business so that workers rights 
are not adversely impacted by changes in product design, 
extended terms of payment and other speciﬁ cations 
dictated by the buyer.
Th is report also calls attention to companies that are 
rarely in the international media spotlight and feel far 
less pressure, if any, to comply with corporate social 
responsibility standards. Th ey have not taken the issues 
faced by workers producing soccer balls seriously and 
have not taken steps to address them.  Furthermore, 
there is a need to determine the ways in which sourcing 
practices of the buyers have adverse impacts on workers 
and what steps must be taken by the buyers and industry 
associations to send a clear signal to all suppliers that labor 
rights in the production of soccer balls must be respected.
Industry associations such as FIFA and the World 
Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI) 
need to utilize their common platform to focus on 
improving wages, transitioning to permanent jobs, 
protecting the rights of workers to form unions and 
most importantly providing incentives for “approved” 
and “inspected” manufacturers by prioritizing sourcing 
to those that have strong labor standards in place.
To conclude, ILRF calls on the soccer ball industry, 
in coordination with trade unions and civil society, to 
take immediate action to address the issues of extremely 
low wages, proliferation of temporary workers, and a 
lack of civil society engagement in order to improve 
conditions for the workers that produce the ball at the 
center of the World Cup 2010 games.  Th e continued 
use of a multi-stakeholder process which includes trade 
unions, industry, local manufacturers, civil society, and 
monitoring entities is essential in order for workers 
rights to be protected in the production of soccer balls. 
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The Soccer Ball Industry:
Th e World Cup is a major business opportunity for 
soccer ball brands, especially those key brands with the 
highest concentration of market power, such as Nike and 
adidas. During the 2006 World Cup, adidas’ revenue 
in the soccer category increased more than US $800 
million4. However the proﬁ ts have not beneﬁ ted the 
workers that toil in factories, stitching centers and homes 
to produce these beloved balls. (See Table 1)
Table 1: Comparison of Wages: CEO VS Workers (US $) 5
Nike’s CEO Pakistani 
Workers
Indian 
Workers
Year 2009 US $3,950,000 US $708 US $600
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce and the 
U.S. International Trade Commission, the majority of soccer 
balls are made in China, Pakistan, India and Th ailand.
Pakistan was the largest producer of soccer balls in 
the late 1990s, producing an estimated 75% of the 
hand-stitched soccer balls in the world7.  With the 
development of new materials and technological 
innovations in the production process, China posed a 
signiﬁ cant challenge to the traditional hand-stitched 
model in Pakistan and India. Nevertheless, Pakistan 
continues to be the primary source for high quality, 
hand-stitched soccer balls while China and Th ailand 
have emerged as the principal producers for machine-
stitched soccer balls.  India primarily produces low to 
medium quality hand-stitched balls. 
The Soccer Ball Industry and Child Labor:
In the late 1990s, a number of high proﬁ le articles and 
reports were published detailing the use of child labor 
within the sporting goods industry in southern Asia, 
speciﬁ cally within the soccer ball industry. Life magazine 
published an article in 1996 on the story of a 12-year old 
boy named Tariq, a child worker stitching soccer balls 
in Pakistan.  In addition an ILO study estimated that at 
least 7,000 children between the ages of 5 and 14 were 
engaged in soccer ball stitching8.  Th e reports shocked 
the public and sent many major soccer ball brands such 
as Nike, Baden, and adidas reeling in the wake of such 
negative media attention9.  
In the mid-1990s, the International Labor Rights 
Forum (ILRF) partnered with organizations in Pakistan 
to continue to monitor the situation and push for 
changes in the soccer ball industry. Following the 
public exposure, buyers were forced to take action.  
Major brands began to demand that local suppliers 
meet International Labor Organization (ILO) core 
labor standards conventions on child labor and comply 
with their own codes of conduct10.  Th e initial step 
to assuage the negative reaction from the media and 
the public was a Code of Labor Practice adopted by 
the International Federation of Football Associations 
(FIFA) in 1996.  Th is code was designed to be applied 
to all manufacturers who produced balls carrying the 
FIFA label.  Th e code negotiated by the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (now the 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)), the 
International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers 
Federation (ITGLWF) and the International Federation 
of Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Employees 
(FIET) prohibited the use of child labor, guaranteed 
workers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively, and 
ensured fair and safe working conditions11. 
  
However, the World Federation of Sporting Goods 
Industries (WFSGI) rejected the FIFA code, and 
therefore a new one was drafted in 1997 focusing 
solely on issues of child labor. Th is code was developed 
through discussion with the ILO, UNICEF, Save the 
   
Table 2: US Imports of Soccer Balls for Consumption 2004-2009 (in actual US dollars)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
China 25,084,501 26,179,882 32,395,627 32,901,199 36,603,669 31,108,439
Pakistan 16,434,130 16,324,885 20,364,242 14,869,219 15,335,329 11,623,939
India 1,009,428 1,658,677 2,877,121 1,441,242 2,266,025 1,443,765
Thailand 370,172 710,654 1,394,845 1,629,041 1,357,368 607,108
(Sources: Data have been compiled from tariff  and trade data from the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. 
International Trade Commission6 ) 
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Children (UK), and the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (SCCI).  On February 14, 1997 in Atlanta, 
Georgia, the Partners’ Agreement to Eliminate Child 
Labour in the Soccer Ball Industry in Pakistan (more 
commonly known as the Atlanta Agreement) was signed 
by representatives from the above organizations with 
the goal of eliminating child labor from the industry 
within 18 months.  To this end, international sporting 
goods brands agreed to only source soccer balls that were 
made in Pakistan from manufacturers who could ensure 
that children were not used during the production of its 
balls12.  Th e agreement focused on two areas: (1) child 
labor prevention and monitoring in Sialkot by the ILO’s 
International Programme for the Elimination of Child 
Labour (IPEC); and (2) social protection implemented 
by UNICEF and Save the Children (UK) along with 
the Pakistani Government and NGOs with a focus on 
training and education13 .With the signing of the Atlanta 
Agreement, the more complete code composed by the 
ITUC and FIFA in 1996 was never implemented14.
ILO-IPEC carried out monitoring in Sialkot between 
1998 and 2003 with the ﬁ nancial support of SCCI and 
FIFA.  In 2002, a Pakistani monitoring organization 
was created: the Independent Monitoring Association 
for Child Labour (IMAC). In 2003, the second phase of 
the Atlanta Agreement began which aimed to make the 
program more locally sustainable, and monitoring duties 
were passed from ILO-IPEC to IMAC. 
At the same time that child labor in the sporting good 
industry was found in Pakistan, it was also uncovered 
in India. In 1997, the South Asia Coalition on Child 
Servitude (SACCS), a network made up of more than 
500 non-governmental organizations in India, began 
discussion of the problem of child labor in India with 
WFSGI, the Sports Foods Export Promotion Council 
(SGEPC), several sporting goods exporters, the National 
Human Rights Commission, UNICEF, and the National 
Trade Union Centre.  Th ey decided to form a Joint 
Committee that would be made up of the Sports Goods 
Export Promotion Council, the sports goods industry 
itself, experts and SACCS15.
A month after the decision was made to form the 
committee, Christian Aid and SACCS published the 
report “A Sporting Chance” which discussed child labor 
in the sporting goods industry.  Th e report claimed that 
between 25,000 and 30,000 children were working in the 
sporting goods industry in India.  Th is claim generated 
both a great deal of publicity and strong objections from 
the Sporting Goods Industry which eventually led to the 
demise of the proposed joint committee16.
Th e Sports Goods Manufacturers’ and Exporters’ 
Association (SGMEA) took up the cause of ending 
child labor in India shortly after the joint committee’s 
attempt failed.  In its ﬁ rst survey of the industry, 18 
exporters took part and only seven children were found 
to be stitching soccer balls.  Th e conﬂ icting reports led 
the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (FICCI) along with ILO-IPEC to commission 
a study focusing on child labor and socio-economic 
conditions in the Jalandhar area of Punjab.  Th e study 
was completed by the V.V. Giri National Labour 
Institute and found that close to 10,000 children were 
stitching soccer balls in the Jalandhar district of India17.
Similar to what followed in Pakistan after child labor 
was exposed, two diﬀ erent approaches developed after 
the release of the diﬀ erent reports and studies in India.  
SACCS began its Fair Play Campaign in 1998, which 
focused on training and education of children as well as 
their mothers.  Th e exporters formed the Sports Goods 
Foundation of India (SGFI) in 1999 which was similar 
to IMAC in terms of its mission and monitoring system. 
Ghazala, 60, has been stitching soccer balls for AKI for years as a casual 
laborer. Her monthly wage is 5,200 PKR (US$64) which is less than the 
legal minimum wage.  She needs 12,000 PKR (US$148) to cover her 
living expenses. She is also a mother of three children. When she was 
asked about her hopes for the future, she responded that ‘there is no 
future.’ All she wished was that her children could receive an education.
W O R K E R 
S T O R Y
A FEMALE STITCHER 
FROM AKI: (GHAZALA)
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Unlike Pakistan, however, a formal commitment such as 
the Atlanta Agreement never materialized in India. ILO-
IPEC was not part of the monitoring program due to the 
Indian government’s rejection, which resulted in the U.S. 
government’s withdrawal of its ﬁ nancial support. Instead, 
FIFA provided US $400,000 over a period of four years to 
maintain the SGFI’s monitoring mechanism. 
ILRF and the Soccer Ball Industry:
Th e International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF) has 
been at the front line of combating child labor in the 
soccer ball industry for over a decade. In 1996, ILRF 
launched its “Foul Ball Campaign” which mobilized 
soccer players and consumers of soccer balls around the 
world by calling attention to the plight of thousands of 
children who were working full time stitching soccer 
balls in the Sialkot region of Pakistan.  Th is campaign 
also eﬀ ectively contributed to the creation of the Atlanta 
Agreement.  Th ree years later in 1999, and one year 
after the agreement’s implementation, ILRF released a 
critical report, Child Labor in the Soccer Ball Industry: 
A Report on Continued Use of Child Labor in the Soccer 
Ball Industry in Pakistan, discussing the short-comings 
of the program that had been put in the place by the 
Atlanta Agreement.  ILRF’s partner organizations in 
Pakistan found that many manufacturers who signed 
the agreement had not paid their dues or provided any 
information about their stitching centers, that children 
were still being used in the stitching centers of some 
participating employers, that soccer ball production was 
potentially shifting out of Sialkot to unregulated areas 
of Pakistan, and that schools created to serve soccer-
stitching children may instead have been serving other 
children while soccer ball stitchers continued to work18.  
At this time, the ILO planned to expand its program 
into other areas and industries but ILRF cautioned 
against this step, explaining that obvious problems 
must ﬁ rst be eliminated from the program.  ILRF has 
remained deeply involved in the issue of child labor in 
the sporting goods industry over the years.  Since the 
release of the 1999 report, ILRF has contributed to two 
major reports on child labor in the soccer ball industry:  
Labour Standards in the Sports Goods Industry in India – 
with special reference to Child Labour (2002) and Child 
Labour in Football Stitching Activity in India (2008). 
Timeline
Date Activity
1996 ILRF Foul Ball Campaign Launched
1999 Report: “Child Labor in the Soccer Ball 
Industry: A Report on Continued Use of 
Child Labor in the Soccer Ball Industry 
in Pakistan”
2002 Report: “Labor Standards in the Sports 
Goods Industry in India-With Special 
Reference to Child Labor”
2008 Report: “ Child Labour in Football 
Stitching Activity in India: A Case Study 
of Meerut District in Uttar Pradesh” 
(released in coordination with Bachpan 
Bachao Andolan (BBA) in India)
Th e Atlanta Agreement and the subsequent monitoring 
programs are often seen as one of the ﬁ rst examples 
of a multi-stakeholder response to corporate social 
responsibility issues. Th e engagement of various players 
in the problem solving process, namely international 
buyers, local manufacturers, international civil 
society organizations, trade unions, UN agencies 
and governments, was perceived positively by the 
international community. However, the spotlight was 
removed from the soccer ball industry for a number of 
years until 2006 when there were allegations of child 
labor and violations of other international labor standards 
at Saga Sport, a key Nike supplier in Sialkot, Pakistan.  
Nike decided to cut ties with this supplier and has since 
shifted its business to Silver Star Group in Sialkot. 
Unfortunately, the past decade’s eﬀ orts have not resulted 
in the eradication of child labor in soccer ball stitching 
though it appears to have decreased in Sialkot, Pakistan. 
Despite eﬀ orts undertaken by governments, advocacy 
groups, and industry members alike, child labor still exists 
in the soccer ball industry where stitching is outsourced to 
home-based work.  In addition, other issues, such as the 
use of casual or temporary labor, low wages, overtime and 
hazardous working environments persist.
WORKING CONDITIONS
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In the Atlanta Agreement, the awareness-raising scheme 
was exclusively concentrated on the importance of 
education for children and the serious health and 
developmental hazards of child labor19. Poverty level 
wages and other labor rights violations were generally 
ignored. Child labor continues to exist in the industry in 
part because not enough emphasis is put on the current 
realities of adult workers and what can be done to improve 
their situation. It is essential for buyers and manufacturers 
to recognize the link between child labor and other labor 
violations.  Among other root causes of child labor in 
South Asia, the persistence of child labor in export sectors 
is a symptom of low wages paid to adult workers, and if 
adults were provided with wages that meet their families’ 
basic needs, then child labor would likely decrease. 
In the soccer ball industry, stitching, the most labor 
intensive part in the construction of a soccer ball, is still 
done in informal settings such as stitching centers and 
home-based work. In this case, due to the low level of 
skills required, it is very easy for children to get involved. 
To make matters worse, if adult workers are not being 
paid enough to provide for their family, children are very 
likely to be used as extra hands given that workers are 
paid per ball they stitch. It is absolutely crucial to create a 
system where the stitchers including home-based workers 
and stitching center employees are employed directly by 
the manufacturers and provided with all of the required 
wages and beneﬁ ts.  Only when the adults are able to 
provide for their families and pay the costs of education 
will children be aﬀ orded the opportunity to attend school. 
Th is section aims to analyze the working conditions 
in Pakistan, India, China and Th ailand. Our ﬁ ndings 
indicate that precarious labor, low wages, poor working 
conditions and violations of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights are found in the value chain 
of hand-stitched soccer balls in three of the four focus 
countries: Pakistan, India and China. Despite cultural, 
political, religious and economic diﬀ erences, workers in 
the soccer ball industry are similarly exploited regardless 
of the country of production.
What follows is a 
detailed analysis 
of the working 
conditions in each 
of the countries 
of focus.  Our 
analysis begins with 
Pakistan, where 
local partner NGOs 
conducted on-site 
research throughout 
2009 interviewing 
workers and visiting 
factories in the 
Sialkot sporting 
goods production 
cluster. Next the 
report discusses the 
working conditions 
in India, China, and 
ﬁ nally Th ailand, 
relying heavily on 
secondary sources.  
As the data will show, working conditions in the global 
soccer ball supply chain are deeply connected to the way 
the industry is constructed and the ability of buyers to 
externalize risk. On the contrary, these violations have 
everything to do with the industry itself.
Labor rights protections are being undermined 
worldwide as workers are seeing permanent, regular 
jobs being replaced by contract labor and temporary, 
unstable work. This phenomenon has become known as 
“precarious work” in the international labor community. 
In the US, it is often described as temporary work. These 
workers are subject to unstable employment, lower 
wages and more dangerous working conditions. They 
rarely receive social benefi ts and are often denied the 
right to join a union. Even when they have the right to 
unionize, workers are scared to organize if they know 
they are easily replaceable. Unionized workers also suff er 
because with fewer members, they have less power at 
the bargaining table and less ability to grow.
What is Precarious Work?
Th e high concentration 
of labor rights 
violations in the 
sporting goods industry 
has little to do with 
each country’s labor 
laws or cultural 
traditions. Despite 
cultural, political, 
religious and economic 
diﬀ erences, workers in 
the soccer ball industry 
are similarly exploited 
regardless of the 
country of production.
WORKING CONDITIONS
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PAKISTAN
Th e export data obtained from the U.S. Department 
of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade 
Commission suggests that Pakistan is the second largest 
soccer ball exporter country. In the late 1990s Pakistan 
was the leading producer of soccer balls, producing an 
estimated 80 percent of the hand-stitched soccer balls 
in the world. With the rise of production in China, 
Pakistan lost its premier position. Nevertheless, Pakistan 
continues to be the primary source for high quality 
hand-stitched soccer balls. 
Soccer ball production in Pakistan is concentrated in 
Sialkot, a region close to the disputed border with Indian 
Kashmir. Some observers have credited the sporting 
goods industry with creating a rare oasis of wellbeing 
in Sailkot, such that the average annual income is 
US$1,370, twice the national average20.  According to 
IMAC, there are 224 manufacturing ﬁ rms and 1,997 
registered stitching centers21. Manufacturers produce top 
end match balls for major brands like Nike, adidas and 
Puma as well as lesser known brands. 
Th e hand-stitched soccer ball manufacturing process in 
Pakistan is highly segmented. Th e labor intensive stitching 
process is outsourced to workers in stitching centers and 
in homes, where workers work on a casual basis and 
are paid by piece rate. Th e rest of the process, including 
lamination, cutting panels, screen printing, quality control 
and packing, is completed by factory workers. 
Th e supply chain segmentation of soccer balls produced 
in Pakistan can also be found in countries like India and 
China (see following sections). Th e process is derived 
from a shift from leather balls to synthetic balls in the 
late 1980s22. Originally, the panels that make up a soccer 
ball were hand-cut with hand-perforated holes. Th e 
decrease in demand for leather shifted the production 
of soccer balls to synthetic panels that were die-cut 
with perforations. Th e switch to synthetic panels and 
the elimination of hand perforated holes for stitching 
decreased the skill needed to produce a soccer ball, and 
made it possible to stitch soccer balls in a more informal 
setting, such as the home. Additionally, by outsourcing 
stitching work, manufacturers are able to keep overhead 
costs down, circumvent local laws and retain ﬂ exibility 
especially in low seasons of orders23. 
In Pakistan, stitching centers were created to overcome 
certain cultural barriers.  Single-sex centers in the 
village oﬀ er women a place to work (see Section on 
Gender-Based Discrimination on page 13 for more 
information). Th ey are also seen as a way to provide 
female stitchers with a better working environment and 
more eﬀ ectively monitor code of conduct enforcement24. 
However, the organization and management of stitching 
Table 3. US Imports of Soccer Balls for Consumption 2004-2009 (in actual US dollars)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
China 25,084,501 26,179,882 32,395,627 32,901,199 36,603,669 31,108,439
Pakistan 16,434,130 16,324,885 20,364,242 14,869,219 15,335,329 11,623,939
India 1,009,428 1,658,677 2,877,121 1,441,242 2,266,025 1,443,765
Thailand 370,172 710,654 1,394,845 1,629,041 1,357,368 607,108
: PAKISTAN
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: PAKISTAN
centers is complicated and requires more research to 
this end. Some stitching centers are directly managed 
and supervised by the factory. While some stitching 
centers are run independently from the factories, others 
are owned directly by the factory. Th e independent 
stitching centers lack formal contracts with the main 
manufacturers, and instead are owned and operated by 
supervisors or ‘makers’. Th ese makers recruit, employ, 
supervise and pay stitchers on a piece rate basis. Th is 
independence creates a division of the supply chain and 
makes it diﬃ  cult to monitor and to track exactly where 
the stitched balls are manufactured. 
In 2009, in cooperation with local Pakistani NGOs, 
ILRF conducted surveys of workers in seven soccer ball 
manufacturers and supply chains in Sialkot, Pakistan with the 
objective of obtaining information on working conditions at 
the factories, stitching centers and home-based settings. All of 
them are listed as an “A” Category Member of IMAC25. 
Proﬁ le of manufacturers26: 
A. Anwar Khawaja Industrial (AKI) 
Brands and buyers include: Select, Derbystar, Longstreth 
Sporting Goods, Acacia
Products: quality balls, sportswear, protective gears
Size: 3,916 workers (416 regular and 3500 casual employees) 
Fairtrade Labeling Organization certiﬁ ed
 
B. Awan Sport Industries Ltd:
Brands and buyers include: Puma, Adidas, Wilson, Vision, 
Regent Sports
Products: hockey, pad, table tennis’ pedals, soccer balls, track 
suits
Size: 1,200 workers (600 regular and 600 casual employees) 
C. Capital Sports Corporation (pvt) Ltd:
Brands and buyers include: adidas, Capital, Cosmos, Uniﬁ ed 
Sports, M/S Russell Corporation
Products: soccer balls
Size: 410 workers (160 regular and 250 casual employees) 
FIFA Licensee 
D. Kicker Sports (pvt) Ltd:
Brands and buyers include: Proline, Noaz Safari Sportz
Products: all types of sport goods, sportswear and 
goalkeeper gloves
E. Silver Star
Brands and buyers include: Nike
Products: soccer balls
FIFA Licensee and Fairtrade Labeling Organization Certiﬁ ed
F. Talon Sports Private Ltd: 
Brands and buyers include: Zone, Parigi Group Ltd, 
Autonomie Project, Headgear Inc. 
Products: soccer balls, track suit, gloves, knee pad, sheen pad, 
socks, shoes
SA 8000 Certiﬁ ed and Fairtrade Labeling Organization 
Certiﬁ ed
FIFA Licensee 
G. Vision Technology Corporation (pvt) Ltd: 
Brands and buyers include: Mikasa, Vision, Lotto, Umbro 
(owned by Nike), Fair Trade Sports
Products: soccer balls 
SA 8000 Certiﬁ ed and Fairtrade Labeling Organization 
certiﬁ ed
FIFA Licensee
Certifi cation or Labeling Systems27
Name Organization Standards
FIFA licensee (FIFA 
APPROVED or FIFA 
INSPECTED)
FIFA -Soccer ball quality test
-No use of Child labor
-Fair working 
conditions
Fairtrade mark Fairtrade Labeling 
Organization
Fairtrade Standards:
-Guaranteed national 
minimum wage
-No use of child or 
forced labor
-No discrimination 
against women
-Fair Trade price 
premium
Fairtrade Standards:
-Guaranteed national 
minimum wage
-No use of child or 
forced labor
-No discrimination 
against women
-Fair Trade price 
premium
-Freedom of Association 
and right to collective 
bargaining
-Safe and healthy work 
environment
SA8000 certifi ed Social Accountability 
International (SAI)
SA8000: 2008 Standard
-No use of child or 
forced labor
-Safe and healthy work 
environment
-Freedom of 
Association and right to 
collective bargaining
-Meet the legal 
standards of 
working hours and 
compensation
WORKING CONDITIONS
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: PAKISTAN
Key Findings
Casual or Temporary Labor: 
In almost every instance, stitchers were not given access 
to formal work contracts and in many cases a signiﬁ cant 
portion of a factory workforce was considered temporary 
status.  Th e research indicated large portions of workers, 
who even after several years at the same facility, never 
gained permanent status.  In Pakistan, according to the 
Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Ordinance, 1968, “every workman at the time of 
his appointment, transfer or promotion shall be provided 
with an order in writing, showing the terms and conditions 
of his service. A workman who has been engaged in work 
after nine months and completed a probationary period of 
three months in a industrial or commercial establishment 
shall be considered as ‘permanent workman’”28. A formal 
contract is important because it provides a certain level 
of job security, therefore, a worker does not need to 
continually worry about the possibility of losing his or her 
job.  Alternatively, without a formal work contract, workers 
can be subjected to arbitrary reductions in wages, ﬁ ring 
and layoﬀ s.  In Pakistan, the lack of a contract also aﬀ ects 
a worker’s access to the social security system and his or 
her ability to organize a union since both of these rights 
are only available to permanent workers. Workers that 
have formal work contracts are required to register with 
the Social Security Institute. Managers of the factories are 
required to pay a certain amount of money each month for 
each worker registered with the Social Security Institute. 
Lack of formal status means casual labors rarely get the 
social security beneﬁ ts. 
Salim, 28, has been working in Capital for 13 years, but he is still considered a 
temporary worker without access to the social security system. He lives with his 
family in a small house, which is made of mud and has no other facilities except 
electricity and water. He works non-stop from 9am to 5pm and earns 5,200 PKR 
(US$64) monthly at most, while the household expenses are 10,000 PKR (US$123) 
minimum. He would like to send his children to school to obtain a proper education 
and learn skills other than stitching, but up till now this remains his hope for the future.
W O R K E R 
S T O R Y
A MALE WORKER FROM 
CAPITAL  (SALIM)
Methodology 
In cooperation with local 
NGOs, ILRF surveyed 
218 workers in seven 
supply chains (see the 
following table).
Interviews were 
conducted that 
addressed: living and 
family situation, working 
conditions, living 
conditions, wages, working hours and overtime, production quotas, the status of freedom of association, child labor, 
health and safety, discrimination, employment status, and workers’ knowledge of codes of conduct, company auditing 
and other factory certiﬁ cations such as Fair Trade. 
Th e following key ﬁ ndings are presented in percentages of worker responses and the subsequent fraction indicates the 
number of actual responses. When calculating percentages, the report takes into account only those workers who supplied 
answers to the question, so blank answers were not considered. In these cases it has been clearly denoted that percentages 
were taken from a smaller pool of responses, and the exact number can be found in the provided fraction. 
 
 
Factory Workers Stitching center workers Home-based workers Total
Male Female Male Female Male Female
AKI 0 0 21 27 0 0 48
Awan 17 5 0 0 0 0 22
Capital 7 0 0 0 0 0 7
Kicker 0 0 11 3 0 0 14
Silver Star 20 1 0 0 0 0 21
Talon 20 1 26 19 0 15 81
Vision 0 0 24 1 0 0 25
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ILRF’s research found that the prevalent trend in Sialkot 
is casual or temporary contracts.  Of the 218 interviewed 
workers in Sialkot, 70% of them are casual workers. Th ose 
workers who work at home or in stitching centers more 
often fall victim to temporary employment. Th is trend is 
especially true in Talon Sports, Kicker, Vision and AKI, 
where the majority of interviewees worked in stitching 
centers or were home-based workers (see Table 1 and Chart 
1). For instance, only two out of 48 interviewees (4%) from 
AKI were permanent employees, while a large majority 
said that they were hired on casual basis (77%). A similar 
situation was found in Vision, another SA8000, FIFA 
and Fairtrade Labeling Organization-certiﬁ ed company, 
and is listed as an “A” Category Member of IMAC. ILRF 
and its local partner surveyed 25 stitching center workers 
that source products to Vision.  One hundred percent of 
the workers who responded were casual workers. In the 
interviews, many workers complained that they often arrive 
to work in the oﬀ -season to ﬁ nd their workplace closed, 
putting them unexpectedly out of work. Th is lack of job 
security and unstable ﬂ ow of income is a huge obstacle for 
many Vision employees and their families.
Moreover, the data regarding Talon Sports conﬁ rms that 
stitching center and home based workers are more likely 
to be the victims of casual labor. Nearly all surveyed 
workers were employed on a casual or temporary basis 
(75/81; 93%). Th e six workers who had permanent 
employment were all employed at the factory, meaning 
that 100% of the stitching centers and home based 
workers interviewed were causal laborers. Even among the 
six factory workers with permanent employment, four of 
them reported that they had no written contract.
Chart 1: Percent of Permanent and Casual Labor in 
Sialkot, Pakistan
 
As the chart 
indicates, the 
ﬁ ndings in 
Awan and 
Silver Star 
contrast sharply 
with the rest of 
the surveyed 
manufacturers. 
Th e main 
reason is that 
all respondents 
were factory 
workers in 
formal factory 
settings. In 
the past there 
were a few 
factories that 
had stitching done within the factory walls but that this 
practice has been phased out.  Silver Star primarily sources 
to Nike and is the only manufacturer, of which ILRF is 
aware, where all of the stitching is done within the factory. 
Th is production system was developed when Silver 
Star management decided to employ most workers as 
permanent full-time registered workers within the factory. 
Th e argument has been made that the inherent ﬂ exibility 
in casual labor makes it necessary. Stitchers, especially 
female stitchers, could work part time and meanwhile 
be engaged in domestic duties and agricultural work29. 
However, our research found that only four out of the 
202 interviewees who answered the relevant question 
said they worked less than eight hours per day. Th e 
minimum number of working hours was six hours per 
day. Furthermore, in Talon Sports the median length 
of employment for stitching center and home-based 
workers was longer than that of factory workers (four 
years for factory workers, ﬁ ve to six years for home-based 
workers, and ten years for stitching center workers).  It 
is essential to do additional research to determine if, 
in fact, female home based workers desire this kind of 
“ﬂ exible” work arrangement.
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Th e predominant use of casual and temporary labor 
is believed to be the root of labor rights violations in 
Sialkot. Due to the informalization of labor, stitching 
center and home-based workers are not registered, 
unprotected, isolated, and not organized. Th ey are not 
paid decent wages especially in comparison to the wages 
paid at the factory level. Th eir right to organize and 
their access to social beneﬁ ts are limited because of their 
informal employment status. Additionally, the structure 
of the supply chain makes it very diﬃ  cult to monitor for 
labor rights issues. 
Low Wages: 
In 2008 the Pakistani government increased the minimum 
wage of unskilled workers from 4,800 PKR (Pakistan 
Rupees) to 6,000 PKR (US$73.8)30.  Nonetheless, ILRF’s 
research found that workers, especially casual workers 
at the factories, in stitching centers, and in homes were 
routinely paid below the legal minimum wage.  More than 
half of the 218 surveyed workers reported that they did 
not make the legal minimum wage per month. Piece rate 
is the standard payment system in the soccer ball industry 
in Pakistan, according to the interviews with local NGOs.
To make matters worse, the minimum wage itself is far 
short of what is necessary to meet basic needs. 90% of 
all respondents (196/218) said that they were unsatisﬁ ed 
with their income because it was not enough to cover 
their living expenses.  Th is complaint is supported by 
organizations in Pakistan that believe the minimum 
wage needs to be doubled to 12,000 PKR (US$147.6) 
to meet workers’ basic needs.  12,000 PKR would cover 
these basic needs for a family of ﬁ ve:
Food     3,500
Education    2,000
Electricity/gas and other utilities 1,200
Medical    500
Transport    500
Housing    3,500
Miscellaneous    800     
Regarding payment punctuality, of the 209 workers 
in researched supply chains who gave answers to 
whether the payment is on-time, 75% of them said 
‘Yes’. Th e overwhelming majority of interviewees in 
four manufacturers, namely Silver Star (86%), Kicker 
(100%), Capital (83%), AKI (100%) and Vision 
Technology (96%), reported that they got paid on-time. 
However, slightly over half of the responding workers 
(42/80; 53%) in Talon Sports said that they were paid 
late by their supervisors. Wages were sometimes paid as 
much as two months late, which can have devastating 
consequences for the workers and their families. 
Piece rate is the standard payment system in the soccer 
ball industry in Pakistan, according to interviews with 
local NGOs. ILRF’s research results in Kicker, Capital, 
AKI, Talon Sports and Vision Technology support this 
conclusion. Factory workers in Awan and Silver Star 
reported that they received a bonus, while none of the 
surveyed workers from the rest of the ﬁ ve supply chains 
reported that they received a bonus or any other forms 
of incentives.
Overtime: 
Under the 
Pakistani 
Factory Act 
of 1934, 
“No adult 
worker shall 
be allowed 
or required 
to work in 
a factory for more than forty-eight hours in any week, or, 
where the factory is a seasonal one, for more than ﬁ fty 
hours in any week. No adult worker shall be allowed or 
required to work in a factory for more than nine hours 
in any day, or a male adult worker in a seasonal factory 
may work ten hours in any day”32 . Our ﬁ ndings indicate 
that the majority of workers work within the legal hour 
Bahaar, 30, has been working in Vision Technology 
Corporation (pvt) Ltd’s factory for four years. But he is still 
working on a temporary basis and being paid by piece 
rate. He earns 3600 PKR (US$ 44.2831) per month, which is 
40% less than the national minimum wage, whereas his 
monthly expense is about 13,200 PKR (US$ 162). 
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limits. In AKI, 65% of respondents reported workdays 
of eight hours, while 27% of them work nine hours per 
day. However, there were 5 workers in Talon Sports who 
reported working for 11 hours or more per day, and seven 
workers from three diﬀ erent factories: Kicker, Capital and 
AKI reported working for as many as 63 hours per week. 
While the majority of interviewed workers claimed that 
they voluntarily work overtime, there were cases of forced 
overtime labor reported in six supply chains33. Workers were 
potential victims of physical attacks by their supervisors.
Regarding payment for overtime, a substantial 
percentage of surveyed workers in Awan (17/22; 77%) 
and Silver Star (14/21; 67%), where all interviewed 
workers were factory workers, reported that they received 
double payment for extra working hours. All of the seven 
interviewed Talon Sports workers who received a double 
payment for overtime were permanent employees, 
whereas none of the interviewed stitching centers 
and home based workers reported receiving overtime 
payment. None of the interviewed stitching center 
workers from Kicker, AKI or Vision, reported any higher 
than normal piece rate for overtime work. Th ese ﬁ ndings 
once again suggest that stitching center and home-based 
workers are vulnerable due to their informal status. 
Discrimination: 
Gender discrimination is prevalent. Th e median wage per 
month for the 35 total women workers surveyed in Talon 
Sports (3,000-3,999 PRK/ US$36-49) is much lower 
than the median wage for the total men workers surveyed 
(5,000-5,999 PRK/US$60-73). Taking into account only 
factory and stitching center women workers (excluding 
home-based workers), the median increases to 4,000-
4,999 PRK (US$49-61), but still remains lower than 
the median salary earned by male workers. Home-based 
workers, who are all women, have the lowest wages of all 
the interviewed workers, with a median of just 2,000-
2,999 PRK (US$24.6-36.9). Of the women who became 
pregnant, four out of six said that they had been granted 
leave without pay and two said they had been ﬁ red for 
the duration of their pregnancy and then rehired after 
the birth of their child. In both cases, the women faced 
discrimination based on their gender, and in the second 
circumstance, where pregnancy led to ﬁ ring, women’s 
jobs were placed in permanent jeopardy. 
Th e primary reason stated for the creation of the 
stitching center model was to overcome cultural barriers 
by providing women a separate workplace. Also stitching 
centers were said to mitigate the risk of child labor 
which is most often found in connection with home 
based work. It is argued that stitching centers strengthen 
women’s conﬁ dence to work outside the home and their 
ability to deal with sociocultural norms34. However, 
the questions remain: to what extent do the stitching 
centers bring women out of poverty and to what extent 
and in what ways are female stitchers empowered?  
Th e fact that most of the women work in stitching 
centers or in homes on a casual or temporary basis 
means that they are isolated, unprotected, not equally 
treated and not organized. Th eir rights cannot be well 
protected through a formal contract. Th ey are subject 
to arbitrary reduction in wages and ﬁ ring, are blocked 
from accessing medical services and other social security 
programs, and are paid less than male workers at the 
factories.  Instead of empowering women, stitching 
centers created a separate class of women, who are 
underpaid and unrecognized.
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Workers’ Right to Organize: 
Article 17 of the Pakistani Constitution identiﬁ es the 
right to form associations or unions: “every citizen shall 
have the right to form associations or unions, subject 
to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the 
interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public 
order or morality”35. A worker’s right to organize is 
important because it oﬀ ers workers the ability to enter 
into collective bargaining agreements that protect 
them from unfair actions taken by management and 
it provides workers with a grievance process. A union 
could raise industry standards by demanding better 
wages and better working conditions through collective 
action. Unfortunately because such a large percentage 
of workers are hired on a casual basis rather than being 
treated as permanent workers, their rights to organize 
themselves and to bargain collectively are often denied. 
In six out of seven manufacturers that ILRF researched, 
an overwhelming majority of the interviewees either 
claimed that there was no union or that they did not 
know if one existed in their supply chains (See Chart 2).  
Several respondents in Talon Sports told the researchers 
that despite the existence of unions, they were operated 
by management, very weak and exist on paper only. 
Although over half of respondents in Silver Star reported 
that they knew the union in the factory, they had no 
contact with the union representatives. 
Chart 2: Is there is a union in your factory? 
Health and Safety Violations: 
In all seven value chains, a vast majority of respondents 
described their working environment as safe and that 
there is drinking water available at the work place 
(See Chart 3). Seven workers in Awan and Silver Star 
mentioned that they were given masks and gloves for 
protection purpose. However, a troubling seven workers 
in total producing for Awan, Silver Star and Talon Sports 
reported that there were dangerous chemical materials, 
which cause respiration problems, and that the water 
is not clean and undrinkable, especially during the 
summer due to the lack of a water cooling system. Many 
workers in Talon Sports also reported power outages in 
the summer that prevented ventilation in the workplace, 
causing unbearable heat indoors.  
Chart 3: Would you consider your workplace safe or not? 
Moreover, stitching itself is not an easy task. It requires 
workers to stay in a crouching position for long periods 
of time, which often causes body aches and swelling. 
Workers reported that they were suﬀ ering from pain in 
their legs, stomach, shoulder, back, ﬁ ngers, muscles, and 
joints, and that they had swelling in their hands and legs.
Social security protection is very limited in Pakistan. 
Th e Compulsory Group Insurance scheme of 1968 
only applies to permanent workers in industrial and 
commercial establishments36. It does not cover non-
permanent workers, i.e casual or temporary labor, and 
permanent employees in an establishment with less than 
20 employees37. Since a large percentage of workers in 
the soccer ball industry in Pakistan work on a casual 
basis, their access to social security beneﬁ ts is limited. An 
overwhelming majority of our respondents said that they 
did not have access to medical services. Also, a majority 
of workers interviewed were allowed to take sick leave, 
but there are no reported cases of workers receiving pay 
during sick leave. 
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Additionally, it is crucial to point out that a very large 
percentage of respondents are unaware of any code of 
conduct, and of those who are aware, an extremely low 
percentage have read the code of conduct or know how to 
use it to defend their rights. Out of 195 interviewees who 
responded to the question, 158 (81%) said that they have 
not heard of the code of conduct or they do not know one 
existed, while only seven said they have read a code. 
It can be diﬃ  cult to maintain high safety standards 
in an industry with diverse production structures, 
including factories, stitching centers and home-based 
work. However, international law governing labor 
standards and buyer codes of conduct require entities 
operating within the soccer ball manufacturing process 
to know and understand health and safety regulations.  
ILRF believes that freedom of association plays a 
key role in guaranteeing safe and healthy working 
environments by allowing workers to speak freely on 
issues concerning safety standards. 
Yalda stitches fi ve balls per day at a piece rate of 40 PKR, and by 
working six days per week she can earn approximately 5000 to 
5500 PKR (US$61-68) monthly. However, her income is not enough 
to cover basic household expenditure. Survival is diffi  cult and 
education is a luxury. Among her four children, two boys and 
two twin girls, she is only able to pay for one boy’s tuition fee.
W O R K E R 
S T O R Y
A FEMALE STITCHER 
FROM TALON SPORT: 
(YALDA)
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“My name is Malika and I am 36 years old. I worked at a sports ball factory as a soccer 
ball varnisher. I had been working there for 5 years and was feeling pleasures working 
with honesty and hard work. However, I didn’t know that the owner of the factory 
changed women’s work to a contract basis instead of a monthly salary basis. Myself 
and three other women workers argued that we would not work on contract basis. At 
that time my salary was 4,000 Rupees (50 USD) a month. As a result of refusing to work 
on a contract basis, the owner of the factory fi red me along with three other female 
workers and didn’t pay us any dues. Through the labor court, we got all our dues from 
the owner of the factory. However, we were still unemployed. 
“Then what started was a very diffi  cult period for my family. Only my husband was 
employed so the income of the family was reduced. Before, we got free health services 
and medicine from social security but now we have to purchase expensive medicine 
from the market. The most diffi  cult period started when I became ill. When I went for 
a checkup at a private hospital, it was found that I had an infection in my womb that 
had to be operated on. We collected our life savings and assets and sold all of it for 
the operation. I also borrowed money from my relatives. The private hospital looted 
me and all of my money spent on the treatment. After the operation, the doctor 
suggested that I don’t do any kind of hard work for a year. I listened to the doctor’s 
advice. However, my husband’s salary is spent solely on food and we can’t save a single 
penny for our future. 
“My conditions went from bad to worse. My daughter fi nished high school and 
insisted that she take the entrance exam for college, as she wanted to study further. 
My husband and I explained to our daughter that we were not in that position to bear 
her study expenses. Then she threatened that she would commit suicide if she could 
not go to college. My husband and I were scared and said that we would do anything 
to put her through college. I went to another relative and took 5000 Rupees ($62 US) 
as credit for the admission of my daughter into college. Now my daughter is studying 
in college. To add to the hardship, my husband has a breathing problem so at times 
he is unable to go to work, meaning the both of us are not bringing in any income. 
During these times our living condition becomes worse. I do not know what to do or 
how I am going to pay back the loan. 
“Sometimes I think that if the factory owner would have not fi red me from my job, 
I might not be in this situation. If I were working in the factory, all of my treatment 
would be free and I would not be forced to sell my household goods. I would also get 
a monthly salary and our living conditions might be better and then I would not have 
to take out credit.”
W O R K E R 
S T O R Y
MALIKA, A SOCCER 
BALL VARNISHER
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Overview of the industry in India:
Within India, the majority of soccer ball production 
occurs in Jalandhar and the nearby city of Meerut39.  
Th ese two cities account for roughly 75 to 80 per cent of 
all the balls produced in India and are the main drivers 
of an export industry that provided US$100 million for 
India in 200440. 
Like Pakistan, the soccer ball supply chain in India is 
segmented. All procedures needed to make a soccer 
ball, except stitching, are done in the factory. Stitching 
is undertaken by stitchers in stitching centers and 
home-based settings. Stitchers are either directly hired 
by the factory or hired by contractors who take orders 
from manufacturers41.  
Th e World Bank has criticized India’s labor rights 
protection as “among the most restrictive and complex 
in the world”42. Th e body of laws that regulate the 
industrial labor relations system is massive. Th e Contract 
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act of 1970, the 
Factories Act of 1948, the Minimum Wage Act of 1948, 
and Trade Union Act of 1926 – just to list some of the 
most relevant—are a few samples of the large pool of 
labor laws in India. However, the above mentioned 
laws only apply to establishments in which 20 or more 
workers are employed and the manufacturing process is 
being carried out without electrical power43. Th erefore 
all stitching centers with less than 20 workers do not fall 
under any of these regulations.
Low Wages and Overtime:
Factory workers technically fall under the Factories Act 
of 1948, which guarantees them a number of rights, 
including a labor contract, an annual bonus, and double 
pay for overtime. However, the CEC report in 2008 
revealed that the workers did not receive beneﬁ ts from 
the provident fund, the employee state insurance or 
INDIA
In 1997, the Southern Asian Coalition on Child Servitude 
(SACCS) publicized the issue of child labor in the Indian 
soccer ball industry. Despite the fact that there has 
never been a formal multi-shareholders’ commitment to 
combat child labor like the Atlanta Agreement38, a similar 
independent institution like IMAC was established in India 
known as the Sports Goods Foundation of India (SGFI). 
Due to the focus on child labor, the abuse of adult labor 
rights, such as poor working conditions and casual 
work, was to some extent overlooked and inadequately 
researched. However, the National Labor Institute’s 
report, Child labor in the sports goods industry – Jalandhar, 
A case Study (1998) and the Indian Committee of the 
Netherlands’ report Th e Dark Side of Football (2000) (ICN 
report hereafter) provide insights into the industry, not 
only on the child labor issue, but also on the socio-working 
condition of the stitchers in Jalandhar. Th e working paper 
Labor Rights and Sportswear Production in India - A Study of Soccer Ball Industry in Jalandhar released by the 
Center for Education and Communication (CEC report hereafter) in 2008 oﬀ ered updated data on these issues. In 
addition, as an active advocate on the front line of combating child labor in the soccer ball industry, ILRF released 
a research report in 2008 on the extensive use of child labor and debt bondage in the production of soccer balls in 
India’s Meerut District. Th e research identiﬁ ed as many as ten companies sourcing from this district, which sell their 
soccer balls in the United States.
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minimum wage for which they were eligible44. Th ey did 
not get double payment for overtime, their wages were 
insuﬃ  cient to cover basic needs and they were forced 
to do extra work, frequently taking stitching work 
home to earn more45.  Even more concerning was that 
the fact that the factory workers are unaware and not 
given adequate information on their labor rights. Th is is 
especially true for workers in rural areas46. 
Stitchers in stitching centers: Th e ICN report from 2002 
revealed that stitching centers are exempt from the 
Factories Act of 1948, and are therefore denied the rights 
protected in this act47.  Th ere is also no labor contract 
nor any form of beneﬁ ts like bonuses, insurance or 
leave48. Similar to Pakistan, stitchers work on a casual 
or temporary basis which makes them particularly 
vulnerable to labor rights violations. Workers told 
CEC researchers that “there is no guarantee of work 
tomorrow and everything depends on the mercy of 
the contractor”49. In the late 1990s, when the child 
labor issue ﬁ rst grabbed the public’s attention, SGFI, 
the industry monitoring scheme, claimed that the pay 
rates for soccer balls varied in a range from 21.90 INR 
(Indian Rupees) (US 55 cents)50 for a low quality ball 
to 29.75 INR (US 74 cents) for a top quality ball51. 
Th e normal productivity of a stitcher was said to be six 
to seven cheap balls or three to four good quality balls 
per day, which implied a stitcher’s daily income was far 
above the minimum wage (the minimum wage in the 
State of Punjab where Jalandhar is located was 63 INR 
(US$1.6) a day and 1,753 INR (US$44) a month in 
1998)52. However, the National Labor Institute’s report 
presented a very diﬀ erent reality. Th e report stated that 
the average piece rate for an average soccer ball was 12 
INR (US 30 cents) and a stitcher could make four balls 
per day. At this pay rate, it was impossible for a stitcher 
to earn the oﬃ  cial minimum wage53. 
Th e 2008 CEC report indicated that the situation has 
not improved since 2002. One of the workers stated that 
there are more workers but less work due to an increase 
in the labor force and stitchers were actually paid less. In 
2006, the legal minimum wage in the State of Punjab was 
raised to 2250 INR (US$50)54 a month, but none of the 
workers interviewed were found to earn this amount of 
money per month55. Moreover, because of the low wages, 
overtime became a necessity for the workers to make ends 
meet. Most of the stitching center workers also stitched at 
home to make extra money to cover living expenses. Th e 
risk of child labor is therefore increased. 
Home based 
workers in India 
are not protected 
by any of the 
above mentioned 
regulations. Th ey 
are completely 
dependent on the 
contractors who 
receive orders from 
manufacturers and 
distributes them 
to home based 
workers. Th ey do 
not have bargaining 
power over their 
rates and they are 
excluded from all 
forms of beneﬁ ts56. 
Th e cases discussed in the CEC report indicated that 
while there is noticeable seasonal wage diﬀ erence, 
even the monthly earning during the busy season were 
insuﬃ  cient to cover family expenditures. One worker 
earned 2500 INR (US$57.50) per month by working 
fourteen hours daily whereas the monthly expenditure of 
his family was about 12000 INR (US$276)57.
Furthermore, there is a disparity in wages among 
workers. Workers in urban areas have higher price rate 
than workers in rural areas for making the same balls58. 
Women earn 4-5 INR (about US 11 cents) less than 
men per ball59. Th ere is no standard piece rate. Stitchers 
who are directly hired by exporters have higher piece rate 
pay whereas workers under contractors get a lower rate 
due to the commission taken by contractors60. Stitchers 
are excluded from the price negotiation process and 
the rate in most cases is determined entirely between 
manufacturers and contractors61.
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Child Labor:
As discussed above, since workers are paid per unit and 
the piece rate is not enough to cover even basic needs, 
children are often used as extra hands to stitch soccer 
balls. ILRF and BBA’s report “Child Labour in Football 
Stitching Activity in India: A case Study of Meerut 
District in Uttar Pradesh” documented the prevalence of 
child labor in the soccer ball industry in Meerut. In its 
selected sample households, ILRF found that 9% of boys 
and 18% of girls aged 6-17 years were pursuing full time 
soccer ball stitching activity, and a signiﬁ cant proportion 
(43% of boys and 57% of girls) were engaged in both 
stitching as well as school activity62. Even after a full 
day’s work the children could only produce a maximum 
of two soccer balls and earn a best 3-5 INR (US 7 cents) 
per ball, which is 40 times less than its retail price63. 
Health and Safety Violations: 
Th e general working conditions of the industry have 
been described as “pathetic”64. In stitching centers, 
proper drinking water and medical care facilities are 
often absent65.  ICN researchers found that in some 
centers there were no toilets66. For home based workers, 
their work place is usually situated within the living 
rooms, the majority of which are too small. Electricity is 
not always available, and the whole stitching process is 
undertaken in dark and dingy rooms67. Th e long hours 
of arduous squinting may damage workers’ eyesight68. 
Needle piercings, headaches, backaches, muscular 
pains, and loss of eye sight are very common among 
all stitchers regardless of their working locations. Th e 
ICN report documented that stitchers pull and bite the 
chemically treated thread 
with their teeth. Most 
workers do not treat their 
health problems. Th is 
may be due to the fact 
that they cannot aﬀ ord 
health care costs69. 
...stitchers pull and 
bite the chemically 
treated thread 
with their teeth.
WORKING CONDITIONS
20INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FORUM           SOCCER BALL REPORT 2010
: CHINA
CHINA
China used to be the key supplier of low-end machine-
stitched soccer balls. With the development of new 
materials and innovation in production process 
technologies, China poses signiﬁ cant competition to 
soccer ball industries in Sialkot, Pakistan and Jalandhar, 
India. Th e oﬃ  cial match balls at the center of 2010 
World Cup are produced in China using high technology 
and requiring less stitching work. Most of the machine-
stitching production is carried out in large factories in 
the southeastern part of China, especially Fujian and 
Guangdong Provinces70. In addition, there is a hand-
stitched soccer ball production network in the province 
of Jiangsu71. Th e production model there is similar to the 
one in Pakistan and India. Stitching work is outsourced to local residents in rural areas, the majority of whom are 
women and children, with the rest of the production process being completed in the factories72.
Overtime: 
Excessive working hours constitute a major problem 
highlighted by various research projects, including the 
Fair Labor Association (FLA)’s Soccer Products Industry 
project (2008), Play Fair’s Clearing the Hurdles (2008) 
and Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee’s 
(HKCIC) research on working conditions in the soccer 
ball factories in mainland China in 2002. 
According to China’s 1994 Labor Law, “labourers shall 
work for no more than eight hours a day and no more 
than 44 hours a week on the average. Th e employer shall 
guarantee that its labourers have at least one day oﬀ  a 
week”73. However, HKCIC researchers found that in a 
factory called Guan Ho Sporting Goods Ltd, workers 
often worked up to 14 to 15 hours a day in departments 
such as the cutting, stitching, hand stitching and 
packaging. During the busy seasons, the working hours 
can extend up to 20 to 21 hours, with workers working 
for an entire month without any days oﬀ 74.  Similar 
ﬁ ndings were reported by Playfair’s investigators at 
factories in the Pearl River Delta region. In that region, 
overtime totaled 232 hours per month during the peak 
season, six times higher than the legal limit75. While the 
length of overtime may vary from one factory to another, 
but it is fair to say excessive overtime is a very common 
practice in soccer ball factories in mainland China. 
Overtime is the result of systemic ﬂ aws in the soccer 
ball industry.  First, legal enforcement that can protect 
workers from exploitation is non-existent.  Secondly, 
due to the complex global production network, delays 
in order conﬁ rmations or last minute changes in 
speciﬁ cations are very common. Th ese delays in the 
start of production  requires extra working hours to 
meet shipment deadlines76. Th ird, the production is 
frequently interrupted by power outages. With the rapid 
economic development of the country, the demand for 
energy has increased dramatically. Since 2000, China has 
experienced a nationwide power shortage. Provinces in 
the Yangtze River Delta, which hosts one of the largest 
labor-intensive industries, have experienced severe energy 
problems. In Zhejiang Province, in the ﬁ rst half of 2004, 
blackouts averaged 11.32 days a month77.  
It is also important to analyze causes at the individual 
level. Most of the workers in the machine-stitched 
soccer ball industry in China are migrants from inland, 
rural areas. Th ese workers must often support families 
at home. Th ey work long overtime hours because they 
needed the supplemental income when their regular 
wage is below minimum wage78.
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Child Labor: 
Abuse in machine-stitched soccer ball factories is 
only half of the story. In 2009, the China Business 
Journal79 released an article that exposed Nike hand-
stitched soccer ball manufactures’ use of unauthorized 
subcontracting80.  In order to reduce production costs, 
Nike’s key Chinese supplier, Wande Sports Goods Ltd, 
outsourced a large number of orders, between 2002 and 
2007, to families in rural areas without authorization 
from Nike. It was later discovered that child labor was 
being used in these unauthorized home-based stitching 
locations. Local residents, mostly women and children, 
stitched soccer balls in homes for only 5 yuan (US 75 
cents) per ball81. 
Th e fact that most of the stitchers worked out of their 
homes meant that overtime was a very common practice 
but was nearly impossible to monitor. In order to make 
more money, many female residents worked up to eleven 
hours a day82. High productivity is also an indication of 
excessive overtime. An experienced craftsman can sew 
three balls per day within the legal eight working hours, 
while the record of the reported factory showed that 
many employees could stitch eight to nine soccer balls 
per day, some as many as eleven83. Th is subcontracting 
may be more common than what is realized and it 
requires due diligence on the part of the buyers to 
make sure they are fully aware of the capacity of a given 
workforce so that a buyer is able to monitor whether this 
sort of problem is occurring either because of the use of 
additional workers or excessive overtime.
Low Wages: 
Factory workers:  According to the Chinese Labor 
Act, “Speciﬁ c standards on minimum wages shall be 
determined by the people’s governments of provinces, 
autonomous regions or municipalities directly under 
the Central Government. Th e employing unit shall pay 
laborers no less than 150% of the normal wages if the 
extension of working hours is arranged, no less than 
200% of their wages if no rest can be arranged afterwards 
for the laborers asked to work on days of rest and no less 
than 300% of their wages on legal holidays”84.  Despite 
this legislation workers are rarely compensated accurately 
for the hours of overtime they work.  
For example, the legal minimum wage in Dongguan City 
(Guangdong province) in 2002 was 450 yuan (US$ 57.6985) 
a month. However, according to the HKCIC report, at 
Guan Ho Sporting Goods Ltd located in Dongguan City, 
the average income of sewing workers ranged from 300 
yuan (low season, US$ 36.3) to1000-1400 yuan (maximum 
wage during the busy season, US$121-169.4)86. Workers 
were paid per ball they produced, the unit price was set and 
workers were given a daily production quota87. During the 
high seasons, the quota was set so high that sewing workers 
had to work very fast or work overtime to reach their quota. 
Th ere was no overtime compensation whatsoever88. It was 
argued that paying per unit motivated the workers to work 
as ‘eﬃ  ciently’ as possible, which conveniently avoided the 
question of overtime payment. In order to earn 1400 yuan 
(US$ 180) in the peak season, employees worked for more 
than 15 hours per day89.
In addition to excessive uncompensated overtime and 
low wages, delays in wage payment were also identiﬁ ed 
as a problem in some factories. Both the Play Fair’s and 
HKCIC’s reports found this to be the case. Th e delay 
could be as long as 40 days90. Th e fact that pay could be 
further delayed during high season eﬀ ectively jeopardized 
a worker’s ability to change jobs91. Falsifying wage records 
was also noted as a common practice among contractors 
to pass buyer inspections. One factory worker in the Pearl 
Delta Region told a Play Fair researcher that he signed 
two wage record sheets when he received his salary after 
40 days of delay. One wage record sheet stated the actual 
income, and another stated a wage more than twice as 
high as his received income. Th e second wage sheet was 
for the brand auditors92.
Home based stitchers: Th ere is little information available 
concerning home-based stitchers, and the only data on 
wages available is a 2009 China Business Journal article. 
Home based stitchers, who were hired illegally by local 
factories and stitching centers, were paid by piece rate. 
Th ey earned 5 yuan (US$ 0.64-0.73) per ball93. Th e 
regular output for one person during an eight hour shift 
is four soccer balls, which means that workers could only 
make 20 yuan (less than 3 US dollars) per day and 600 
yuan (less than US $90 US) per month without putting 
in overtime, 37.5% less than the legal minimum wage in 
the province of Jiangsu94. 
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Health and Safety Violation: 
Factories: Th e soccer ball production process is by 
no means hazard-free. For instance, in the cutting 
departments, workers’ ﬁ ngers can be cut if anything 
goes wrong with the operation of the machine. In the 
stamping and sealing departments, workers are exposed 
to poisonous chemicals and extreme heat. HKCIC’s 
report described the hands of their interviewees: ‘‘their 
ﬁ ngers were dry, their skin cracked and their hands 
were crisscrossed with deep lines. Th e roughness of 
the hands of these young female workers oﬀ ered a 
stark contrast to the innocent look on their faces. 
Th eir ﬁ ngernails were broken and all their ﬁ ngers were 
bandaged”95. Th ere are no adequate health and safety 
trainings for workers, nor are they aware of their rights 
and compensations for industrial accidents96. 
Many of the health and safety concerns at the factory 
occur because of the high production levels and quotas 
set by the factories. Th e Play Fair report revealed that 
workers reported not using safety equipment because 
it slowed down production and prevented them from 
meeting quotas determined by management97.   
Internal migrants make up the largest group of soccer 
ball factory workers,  but the household registration 
system or hukou system, which ties citizens’ social 
beneﬁ ts to their hometowns,  blocks these workers 
from enjoying the same access to healthcare and other 
programs  as locally-registered citizens enjoy98.  Th is 
discriminatory policy is often paired with employers’ 
blatant disregard for even the bare minimums regarding 
social insurance coverage mandated by Chinese law.  For 
example, companies routinely refuse to pay for work 
injury insurance or refuse to make contributions to 
workers’ pensions, though by statute they are required to 
do so. According to Play Fair’s report, at the Joyful Long 
factory, which produces sports balls and other sports 
equipment for adidas, Nike, Puma, and Diadora among 
others99, workers were not covered by even legally-
required programs such as workers’ compensation, 
maternity leave, and social insurance100.  In addition, 
workers had their wages deducted if they received any 
services at the factory’s medical center.
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Overview of the 
industry:
Th e 2006 World Cup 
was an important 
benchmark for 
Th ailand’s soccer 
ball production. Th e 
use of a “made in 
Th ailand” machine-
stitched soccer ball as 
the oﬃ  cial World Cup 
game ball not only 
stimulated soccer ball 
production in Th ailand, 
but also signaled 
a shift from hand-
stitched to machine-
stitched production in 
professional tournaments101. Th e balls used in the 2006 
World Cup were produced using a new technology 
where ball panels are bonded thermally to the bladder by 
machines without the need for any stitching102.  
Th is new method of production that requires no stitching 
was intended to be the next wave in the production of 
soccer balls for professional tournaments. If this were 
to happen, Th ailand would be poised to capitalize on 
an increase in demand and countries like Pakistan and 
India, which still focus on hand stitching, would be hurt 
economically. As of yet the move to the thermal bonded 
balls has not happened on a large scale103.
    
Th ere are a series of laws and regulations that oﬀ er labor 
rights legal protection in place in Th ailand. Among 
them, the Labor Protection Act of 1998 is the most 
important one. It sets standards on maximum working 
hours, overtime, holidays, leaves, minimum age of 
employment, occupational health and safety standards, 
and severance pay. However, the protections for 
subcontracted workers, who constitute the largest group 
of workers in the soccer ball industry, are not clearly 
deﬁ ned and as a result their rights, are often violated104. 
Th e Labor Protection Act is poorly enforced. Th is is 
partially the case because the Ministry of Labor (MOL) 
inspectorate is severely understaﬀ ed105. Th ere are 
approximately 600 MOL inspectors nationwide who 
are responsible for inspecting all working conditions, 
including occupational safety and health. Th e 600 
inspectors must cover 200,000 workplaces in Th ailand 
that have 50 or more employees each106. In 2004 a total 
of 400,000 establishments were to be inspected, but the 
MOL inspectorate only managed to cover 24,000 of 
them107. Th erefore, many factories where subcontracted 
labor is used are not adequately inspected or regulated. 
Low Wages: 
Th ere is very little information or literature available 
that addresses the working conditions in the Th ai soccer 
ball industry. A report released by the Th ai Labour 
Campaign (TLC) in 2006, Th e Life of Football Factory 
Workers in Th ailand, is the only one of its kind.  Th is 
report revealed the working conditions in two Japanese 
invested export-oriented factories: Molten Th ailand 
(which produced the 2006 World Cup soccer ball for 
adidas) and Mikasa (producing soccer ball for its own 
brand: ‘Mikasa’). According to TLC’s report, regular 
workers and subcontracted workers were treated 
diﬀ erently in Molten Th ailand in terms of their wages 
and beneﬁ ts108. Th e monthly wage of regular employees 
was up to 9,700 baht (US$ 256) including bonuses and 
free uniforms109. In contrast, workers who were recruited 
via a subcontracting ﬁ rm were given the minimum wage 
– approximately 4,500 baht (US$ 118.8)110—without 
any beneﬁ ts. Seventy-seven percent of their income was 
spent trying to meet basic food needs111. Th e minimum 
wage set by the government was insuﬃ  cient to satisfy 
basic needs and live with dignity. Overtime was become 
a common practice112.
Health and Safety Violations: 
Due to the long working hours and incredibly high 
temperatures inside of the factories, Th ai workers are 
faced with the eﬀ ects of exhaustion on a regular basis.  
Fuller’s 2006 article in the New York Times argued that 
“by the most literal deﬁ nition, this is a sweatshop. 
Th e factory is so hot that workers develop beads of 
perspiration on their upper lips and cheekbones.
Managers sweat through their shirts”113.  
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Conclusion
Over a decade after the signing of the Atlanta Agreement child labor still exists in the soccer ball industry.  As the 
preceding data clearly demonstrates, although action was taken to eradicate child labor in the late 1990s, very little 
was done to end its root causes.  Th e parents working in the soccer ball industry are still receiving next to nothing 
for their work.  Th ey are working as temporary or casual employees and therefore receiving none of the beneﬁ ts 
that can keep their families healthy.  Despite each countries’ cultural and governmental diﬀ erences, the soccer ball 
industries in these countries share the same problems: casual or temporary work, poverty level wages, discrimination, 
restriction of the right to organize or collective bargain, and health and safety violations. Under the current system 
of local industry monitoring and auditing in Pakistan and India, child labor is the only violation that is actively 
monitored and if a violation is found, only the factory or the manufacturer are told, not the brands that source from 
that manufacturer or the public are notiﬁ ed of these violations.  
: CONCLUSION
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Th e companies that proﬁ t from the labor of soccer ball stitchers bear a signiﬁ cant responsibility to ensure that 
workers’ rights are respected.  When child labor in the soccer ball industry was ﬁ rst revealed decades ago, consumers 
and athletes – as well as companies – were looking for ways to ensure that their soccer balls were not tainted by labor 
rights abuses.  In the following years, demand for ethically produced goods across a range of industries has grown 
dramatically around the world and a variety of labels and certiﬁ cation programs have been developed to provide 
various assurances to consumers.  Companies themselves have also instituted their own policies related to labor and 
human rights and environmental sustainability.  
Th e previous sections in this report illustrate the grim reality that despite these commitments, abuse of workers’ 
rights remains widespread.  Th is section explores how some industry initiatives have addressed labor issues.  Serious 
ﬂ aws within many of these systems allow labor rights abuses to continue. 
Independent Monitoring Programs:
Independent Monitoring Association for Child Labor (IMAC)
As the benchmark corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) initiative in the soccer ball industry, the Atlanta 
Agreement laid out the blueprint for regulating the 
industry in Pakistan.  Th e Agreement also created an 
example that other countries, such as India, could follow. 
Th e Agreement proposed a program with two areas of 
focus: (1) child labor prevention and monitoring in 
Sialkot by the ILO’s International Programme for the 
Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) and (2) social 
protection administered by UNICEF and Save the 
Children (UK) along with the Pakistani Government and 
NGOs with a focus on training and education114.  ILO-
IPEC regulated stitching centers through registration and 
unannounced inspection. By joining the program, all 
manufacturers, stitching center locations and all stitchers 
should be registered and open to unannounced audits. 
Each participating manufacturer agreed to set up an internal monitoring department with a senior manager in 
charge to verify its compliance with the program. Employees were provided with training to monitor the use of child 
labor115. By 2000, 68 out of a total of 90 exporting ﬁ rms in the Sialkot cluster, producing more than 75% of the 
cluster’s total exports, joined the IPEC program and overall export levels had risen116. 
In 2002, the Independent Monitoring Association for Child Labor (IMAC) was established by the Sialkot Chamber 
of Commerce & Industry (SCCI) to take over the monitoring duties that IPEC had been performing. As an 
independent not-for-proﬁ t organization, IMAC inherited most of IPEC’s features, i.e. its monitoring strategy, 
procedures, technologies and trained staﬀ 117.
IMAC‘s workplace monitoring system consists of internal and external monitoring. Manufacturers wishing to have 
their workplaces monitored join IMAC voluntarily, and reveal their production sites for monitoring. At the time of 
voluntarily joining the program, the respective manufacturer pays a joining fee to the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (SCCI) and provides detailed information about their company and stitching centers- known as Internal 
“It shall contain the names of those participating 
manufacturers who religiously adhere to all the provisions 
of the programme, as enunciated in the undertaking they 
sign at the time of joining the programme. These provisions 
include undertaking 100% stitching of all hand-stitched 
balls (without any distinction of size, kind, value of the ball) 
at monitorable stitching places; prompt response to any 
query from IMAC; keeping the IMAC updated at all times 
about their stitching activities; closing, opening of stitching 
centers; not involving in any kind of counterfeiting/fake 
production of branded balls; instituting a strong and 
eff ective internal monitoring system.”
Category “A” in IMAC:
WORKING CONDITIONS
26INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FORUM           SOCCER BALL REPORT 2010
CORPORATE SOC AL RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVES
Monitoring Information118. After receiving this information, the name of the respective manufacturer is entered 
into the IMAC’s provisional database, and is then issued a three-digit individual identiﬁ cation code. Th e respective 
manufacturer is required to print this code on a speciﬁ c panel of each ball stitched at that stitching centre. A newly 
joined manufacturer is kept on a waiting list until two monitoring visits of the stitching centers are undertaken. Once 
the initial Internal Monitoring Information is veriﬁ ed by IMAC, the manufacturer is added to the main database and 
signs a contract with IMAC119. Th is undertaking outlines the obligations of a manufacturer as a partner to the program. 
Participating manufacturers are required to provide updated information on stitching activities to IMAC regularly. 
Th e manufacturers are aware that their activities will be monitored by IMAC, and are required to appoint/designate 
internal monitoring managers to carry out internal monitoring to make sure that sub-contractors do not employ 
child labor.  External monitoring takes the shape of independent third party monitoring, conducted by IMAC 
monitors. Workplaces to be monitored are selected on a random basis through a computer program with the goal of 
having each monitoring visit be a surprise visit120.
Th ere are three challenges to the eﬀ ectiveness of IMAC. Th e ﬁ rst and foremost issue facing IMAC is the close 
relationship with the soccer ball industry manufacturers in Sialkot. IMAC’s Board of Governor’s (BOG) Chairman is 
the former President of the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI) and is representing the SCCI while 
on the IMAC Board.   In addition, IMAC receives signiﬁ cant funding by way of monthly fees paid by participating 
manufacturers. With ﬁ nancial resources coming from manufacturers and SCCI’s leadership on the IMAC Board 
of Governors, there is a clear conﬂ ict of interest given that it is the manufacturers that IMAC is monitoring. Th ere 
were a total of 146 sports ball manufacturers that joined the program initially. However, 59 of them, approximately 
40% of all the participants, were removed from the program due to the non-payment of their dues to the SCCI121. 
Speciﬁ cally, in March 2010, ten manufacturers left the program due to non-payment122. Among the remaining 61 
manufacturers in IMAC’s main database (26 manufacturers are on the waiting list), 60 of them are in category “A”, 
which presumes that 98% of their producers scrupulously adhere to all the provisions of the program, including 
undertaking 100% of the stitching of all hand-stitched balls (without any distinction of size, kind, value of the ball) 
at monitorable stitching sites.
ILRF’s research in Pakistan identiﬁ ed cases of IMAC category “A” members that failed to comply with IMAC 
requirements.  Th ree interviewees from three companies, namely Vision Technology, AKI and Talon Sports reported 
the existence of child labor in their value chains. One interviewed worker said: “children work there [in the factory] for 
sewing, but when auditors or other checking party comes, they hide. Th e management knows everything. Children are 
asked to lie about their ages, false documents are also prepared.”
Th e second challenge to IMAC’s eﬃ  cacy and sustainability is human capacity.  According to the latest monthly 
progress report published on IMAC’s website, there are 1,997 stitching centers in the program. Over a period of 
twelve months, IMAC monitored an average of 1,362 stitching centers per month123. However, the number of 
monitors was cut down from 20 to 12 (6 male and 6 female monitors). Initially each visit was conducted in pairs 
of one male and one female.  Now IMAC uses single-monitor visits. Assuming that these 12 monitors work six 
days per week, each monitor would be responsible for visiting ﬁ ve stitching centers a day. Considering travel time 
between stitching centers, it is questionable how detailed and thorough each audit would be, if every audit indeed 
takes place. IMAC is largely ineﬀ ective due to its limited capability and access to resources.  Furthermore, these 
constraints make it diﬃ  cult to search thoroughly for problems other than child labor. It is therefore essential for 
buyers to recognize that even with an IMAC seal of approval, a value chain could be riddled with poverty wages, 
massive use of temporary labor and little ability for workers to form independent trade unions.
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Th e third reason IMAC has failed to raise overall working conditions in Sialkot is because of a lack of working 
relationships with buyers. None of the major brands, such as Nike, adidas and Puma, are on the IMAC board 
or engaged with any of IMAC’s activities on a daily basis. IMAC can be described as an organization of the 
manufacturers, by the manufacturers and only for the local manufacturers. Without including buyers, it is 
reasonable to question how serious local factories take the auditing results. Th is reality is not just a result of IMAC’s 
lack of inclusion, but ongoing tension between what brands and buyers are looking for and local industry priorities.  
Buyers such as Nike and adidas have ongoing compliance programs in Sialkot that require more than a basic 
assessment as to the existence of child labor. Various meetings have occurred over the years between IMAC, local 
industry and buyers but these meetings have not resulted in increased coordination. It is essential for all stakeholders 
to work together in order to tackle and solve the ongoing labor rights violations in the Sialkot soccer ball industry.
However IMAC for all of its faults has remained in Sialkot to continue the work of the eradication of child labor.  
IMAC has received some funding from the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan which may oﬀ er some 
potential opportunities for IMAC to become more eﬀ ective in acting as a third party monitoring entity that is 
accountable to workers.
Sports Goods Foundation of India (SGFI)
SGFI is India’s monitoring program located in the Jalandhar region, not far from the Pakistani border. It was 
established in 1998, but its child labor monitoring program was not started until the end of 1999 with the ﬁ nancial 
support of FIFA124. For the ﬁ rst four years, the monitoring program was run by the Société Général de Surveillance 
(SGS), one of the world’s largest inspection and certiﬁ cation companies based in Switzerland. Since 2003, SGFI has 
conducted the auditing mechanism on its own125. 
SGFI’s monitoring system is similar to IMAC’s program. It is composed of registration, internal monitoring by 
manufacturers and external monitoring by SGFI’s monitors126. In comparison to IMAC, SGFI has a much broader 
mandate. It not only aims to eradicate child labor but also to phase out its root causes through awareness campaigns 
and social programs127. 
Similar to IMAC, SGFI faced challenges in terms of ﬁ nancial independence, sustainability and human capacity. 
First, SGFI was funded initially by FIFA’s donations and contributions from manufacturer members (members 
contributed 0.25% of their earning from soccer ball exports every month)128. FIFA ended its ﬁ nancial support in 
2003 and in 2004 the contribution of members fell to 0.10%129. Currently, SGFI is exclusively funded by the local 
sports industry130, which raises concerns of its independence. 
Second, SGFI currently covers 3,300 stitching units and around 15,000 stitchers131, but there are only 9 monitors in total132. 
It is therefore questionable how eﬀ ective this monitoring program is given its limited capacity. 
In addition, SGFI is much less transparent than IMAC. Th ere is little information publicly available about SGFI’s 
governance, funding mechanism, monitoring procedures or results.  Its monthly Report of Inspection (ROI) is shared 
with members only133. 
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Company and Industry Association Initiatives:
In addition to independent monitoring programs, there are auditing mechanisms at the individual company 
and industry level. Th is report will highlight two company compliance programs though ILRF has gathered data 
regarding several programs from companies such as Puma and New Balance.  It is important to note that ILRF was 
unable to obtain data regarding purchasing policies and more speciﬁ cally how the price that a buyer pays eﬀ ects a 
supplier’s ability to implement strong labor standards. ILRF recognizes the eﬀ orts made by IMAC, local industry 
and buyers, but sees an 
urgent need to determine 
what role purchasing 
practices and low prices 
paid to suppliers lead to 
continual labor abuses.
Brands/Buyers
Based on research and our discussions with key brands ILRF found that the soccer ball industry is divided into two 
tiers. In the ﬁ rst tier, there are the larger brands, such as Nike, adidas and Puma. Th ey are more closely observed and 
more often targeted by the public as well as Northern-based child labor and labor rights advocacy groups. Th ey value 
their corporate images and understand the potential economic loss that could be caused in the event exposure to 
labor rights violations. Th erefore those ﬁ rst tier companies developed codes of conduct and compliance systems, not 
only claiming that they are monitored for potential use of child labor but also other social, environmental, health 
and safety, and compliance issues. 
For example, Nike left the ILO-IPEC program in Sialkot in 2000 and did not use IMAC to monitor its supply 
chain. However, the Saga Sport incident in 2006 brought Nike’s own system into serious question. Saga Sport was 
Nike’s key supplier in Pakistan and a corporate giant, producing 6 million of Pakistan’s annual production of 40 
million soccer balls at that time134. Nike terminated its contract with Saga due to serious labor rights violations in 
Saga and withdrew completely from Pakistan. 
Nike resumed its production in Pakistan in 2007 under a diﬀ erent policy135.  An agreement was reached with 
its newly contracted company, Silver Star, which stated that all production must be undertaken in the factory 
and all workers must be registered as full-time employees who are eligible for social beneﬁ ts136. Additionally, the 
contract ensured contractor compliance with Nike’s labor standards and with all requirements of the 1997 Atlanta 
Agreement137. It gave workers full rights to organize themselves and bargain collectively138. Th is strategy eﬀ ectively 
regulated Nike’s value chain, improved working conditions and simpliﬁ ed the monitoring process. Th e interviews 
conducted by ILRF’s partners in Pakistan conﬁ rmed that Silver Star was paying at least the minimum wage had 
limited use of temporary workers.  In addition, all stitching was done within the conﬁ nes of the Silver Star factory 
complex. However, this policy raised gender concerns. Due to cultural factors, women often do not work within the 
same facilities as men. Th ere are a few women working at Silver Star but none work within the stitching department. 
It is still too early to say to what extent Nike’s new policy can be widely applied 
to the industry. 
Th e rest of the industry, especially small brands and non-branded companies 
are in the second tier. Th ese companies are less visible in the international 
media spotlight, and less motivated to ensure compliance with codes or 
labor standards. Often they are left completely unmonitored. Usually these 
ILRF recognizes the eﬀ orts made by IMAC, local industry 
and buyers, but sees an urgent need to determine what role 
purchasing practices and low prices paid to suppliers lead 
to continual labor abuses.
ILRF researchers 
failed to ﬁ nd a Code 
of Conduct or a list of 
suppliers or factories for 
Molten USA. 
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companies do not have regulations to protect labor rights and do not require suppliers to be monitored or certiﬁ ed 
by any third party. One good example is Molten USA, Inc., which produces the oﬃ  cial ball of the National Premier 
Soccer League and several Central American national soccer federations and leagues139. ILRF researchers failed to 
ﬁ nd a Code of Conduct or a list of suppliers or factories for Molten USA. 
FIFA
As the governing body of the soccer, FIFA is expected to be responsible for more than just organizing the FIFA World 
Cup. Many observers argue that FIFA should make sure that the soccer balls used during the World Cup are produced 
under fair labor conditions. To this end, FIFA introduced the FIFA Quality Concept. On top of the soccer ball quality 
tests, all licensed manufacturers with FIFA marks (FIFA APPROVED and FIFA INSPECTED) are contractually 
obliged not to use child labor140. Moreover, despite the fact that FIFA is not a party to the Atlanta Agreement, FIFA 
made a signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial contribution to both ILO-IPEC in Pakistan and SGFI in India to assist them in carrying out 
monitoring activities in the early stages141.
FIFA claims that “manufacturers of FIFA APPROVED and FIFA INSPECTED footballs commit themselves to 
producing balls under fair conditions,” but FIFA fails to elaborate what exactly entails “fair conditions” and how it 
monitors and ensures manufacturers’ compliance with FIFA’s expectations. Four out of seven supply chains ILRF 
researched in Pakistan are FIFA licensees, and the existence of child labor and other labor abusive practices were 
found to varying degrees in all four FIFA licensed supply chains. (Please see previous section for detailed discussion). 
Moreover, FIFA’s website contains very little information on what FIFA has done to address labor rights issues beyond 
the child labor. Other violations of labor rights such as low wages, unpaid overtime and occupational safety hazards are 
not explored in any of FIFA’s social responsibility programs.
FIFA INSPECTED
Soccer balls for matches/trainings at
all competitive levels
A ball must successfully pass six tests to qualify 
for this label. Th e tests check the ball’s weight, 
circumference, roundness, bounce, water 
absorption and loss of pressure. 
FIFA APPROVED
Top quality soccer balls meeting 
FIFA’s highest demands
A ball must pass each of these six tests under even 
more demanding conditions. Th e constancy of 
the shape and size of the ball is scrutinized in a 
seventh test. Th e ball is ﬁ red against a steel plate 
2,000 times at 50km per hour. Th e ball passes the 
test only if all of its seams and air valves remain 
unscathed and any loss of pressure and changes in 
circumference and roundness are negligible.
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Th e World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI) 
As the world’s authoritative body for products related to the sports industry, the World Federation of the Sporting 
Goods Industry (WFSGI) is an independent association established by sporting goods brands, manufacturers, 
suppliers, retailers, national and regional federations and other sporting goods industry related business. WFSGI has 
a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) committee, which was originally named the Committee on Ethnics and 
Fair Trade (CEFT). Th e main function of the CSR committee was to organize conferences for NGOs, the sports 
industry, governments and international agencies to address CSR issues. In 1997, a code of conduct was adopted by 
CEFT to assist sporting goods companies in ensuring CSR compliance142. Currently, the CSR committee provides 
consulting service to its members in the ﬁ elds of environmental protection and management systems according 
to ISO standards and sustainable development, but provides little guidance regarding basic labor rights outside of 
consulting on occupational health and safety.  Th e CSR committee is currently chaired by adidas and has a high 
proﬁ le list of members including Nike, Pentland and New Balance.  Th is body should take a much more proactive 
role in securing widespread compliance of basic labor rights.
Certifi cation Systems:
In addition to IMAC, SGFI and companies’ own monitoring mechanisms, there are several certiﬁ cation systems 
in place aimed at social responsibility compliance. Among others, Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000) and the 
Fairtrade Labeling Organization (FLO) have certiﬁ ed manufacturers in Sialkot. Th is section will provide a detailed 
analysis of the certiﬁ cation systems carried out by SA8000 and FLO.
Social Accountability International (SA8000)
“Social Accountability 8000 is an auditable standard for a third-party veriﬁ cation system, setting out the voluntary 
requirements to be met by employers in the workplace, including workers’ rights, workplace conditions, and 
management systems. It is grounded on the principles of the core ILO conventions, the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, and the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights”143. Its accreditation process is governed 
by Social Accountability Accreditation Services (SAAS), which grant qualiﬁ ed organizations (known as Certiﬁ cation 
Bodies) to carry out certiﬁ cations, such as Bureau Veritas Certiﬁ cation which is the certiﬁ er for soccer ball value 
chains in Sialkot. 
SA8000’s key elements144: 
No use of child or forced labor;• 
Safe and healthy work environment;• 
No discrimination based on race, caste, origin, religion, disability, gender, sexual orientation, union or • 
political aﬃ  liation or age; 
Freedom of association and right to collective bargaining;• 
No sexual harassment, no corporal punishment, mental or physical coercion or verbal abuse;• 
Meet the legal standards of working hours and compensation.• 
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SA8000 has been called into question. Pakistan Institute of Labor Education & Research (PILER) revealed in a May 
2010 report that, “Many local manufacturers are in possession of the SA8000 certiﬁ cation, which according to a 
source ‘...is being sold in the city on thela (hawking cart) by accrediting companies for 200,000 PRK (US$2460) 
each”145. In addition, last year in 2009, China Labor Watch, a New York City based NGO published a report 
documenting the corruption in Bureau Veritas Certiﬁ cation’s auditing activities in China146, which is a qualiﬁ ed 
SAAS certiﬁ er and conducts monitoring programs in the soccer ball industry in Sialkot. SAAS does have a detailed 
complaints process in place which may be a tool utilized by soccer ball stitchers in the future.
Fairtrade Labeling Organizations (FLO)
Fairtrade Labeling Organization is the governing body of the Fair Trade certiﬁ cation and labeling system. It sets 
standards on how the products shall be produced and purchased, and its independent certiﬁ cation entity, FLO-CERT, 
certiﬁ es producers that have met the standards and thus provides permission for a product to be labeled as Fair Trade. 
FLO argues that Fairtrade standards are “designed to address the imbalance of power in trading relationships, 
unstable markets and the injustices of conventional trade”. Speciﬁ cally, buyers are required to pay a set minimum 
price to producers, and an additional amount of money as premium to improve workers’ and farmers’ social, 
economic and environmental conditions. By doing so, FLO claims that the Fair Trade certiﬁ cation system oﬀ ers 
producers access to larger markets and better trade terms which then protects labor rights on the one hand, and 
enables consumers to contribute to poverty reduction through everyday shopping on the other. 
Speciﬁ cally, in terms of soccer ball industry:
Fair Trade requires workers to be paid at least the national minimum wage;• 
Fair Trade requires producers to ensure piece rate workers receive social beneﬁ ts equivalent of those • 
received by permanent workers; 
Fair Trade requires producers not to use child labor;• 
Each Fair Trade Certiﬁ ed producer must have a Joint Body for Fair Trade Premium. Th e Joint Body shall be • 
composed of elected worker representatives and appointed management representative;
Fair Trade standards ensure there is no discrimination against women• 147. 
However, even though FLO has been certifying soccer ball value chains in Sialkot since 2002, a minimum price 
has not been determined by FLO148.  In addition, the social premium provided to the factory by buyers went from 
15% to 10% in 2005.  FLO-CERT says it is bound by various contracts and conﬁ dentiality agreements which do 
not allow FLO-CERT to share the results of audit ﬁ ndings with workers or any corrective action plans developed 
after an audit has taken place.  However the certiﬁ ed manufacturers have complete access to all of the information.  
Workers are a part of each audit but only in terms of on-site interviews which have been proven to be fairly 
ineﬀ ective in obtaining the most honest and accurate information from workers.  Th is questions what the very basis 
of Fairtrade is really about given that its goal is to empower workers but at the same time, the lack of information 
puts workers at an incredible disadvantage as they work to improve their workplaces.
Moreover, serious problems exist in the production of Fairtrade Certiﬁ ed soccer balls. Th rough partnerships with two 
non-governmental organizations based in Pakistan, ILRF conducted research in 2009 in four Fair Trade Certiﬁ ed 
manufacturers in Sialkot, Pakistan, namely Anwar Khawaja Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Silver Star Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd., 
Talon Sports and Vision Technologies Corporation (Pvt) Ltd. ILRF found that within all four value chains, there were 
violations of labor and social standards detailed within both the generic hired labor and sports ball speciﬁ c standards 
set by FLO, such as wage and social beneﬁ ts violation (for further information, please view the Detailed analysis in 
the Working Conditions section).
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ILRF has identiﬁ ed several critical issues of the Fair Trade certiﬁ cation system including:
No Comprehensive Transparent Grievance Process.•  Workers have no process by which they can inform 
FLO, or its auditors, in a safe and conﬁ dential manner of noncompliance with standards.  
Signiﬁ cant Use of Casual Labor.•  Th is contradicts the meaning for fair trade which is thought to provide 
secure and high quality jobs.  Workers without a permanent work contract in Pakistan do not have access 
to healthcare and other social protections.  In addition, there is a high correlation between causal labor and 
wages below the minimum wage.
Given these concerns, it is very questionable how FLO can continue to certify soccer balls without a complete and 
thorough review and multi-stakeholder process to determine what would be necessary to build a system for sports ball 
workers and stitchers so that they beneﬁ t to the fullest extent. 
Coordination among certiﬁ cations such as FLO and SA8000 is not a regular occurrence.  For example, it is not 
clear if SAAS will review the SA8000 certiﬁ cation of Talon Sports given that the manufacturer has once again been 
suspended from FLO certiﬁ cation.  In addition, there is limited ongoing worker involvement in the certiﬁ cation 
process and in the case of FLO-CERT, communication with civil society 
is not permitted.  Brands have continued to pursue labeling as a way of 
assuring customers that labor rights have been respected.  However, ILRF 
has not seen any evidence to suggest that these certiﬁ ed soccer balls are any 
diﬀ erent than the non certiﬁ ed balls when it comes to basic labor rights 
concerning wages and permanent work.
Coordination among 
certiﬁ cations such as 
FLO and SA8000 is not 
a regular occurrence.  
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
To summarize, labor rights violations across the soccer ball 
industry in Pakistan, India, China and Th ailand include: 
Th e predominant use of precarious labor in the • 
hand-stitched soccer ball industry
Wage violation• 
Health and safety violation• 
Lack of respect for freedom of association and the • 
right to bargain collectively
Th ese problems ILRF identiﬁ ed and analyzed in this report are 
not new. Th e soccer ball industry’s organization of production, 
the unequal relationship between buyers and suppliers, and 
other factors have often negated even the best eﬀ orts to ﬁ x the 
endemic problems that continue to plague this industry. 
Th e following table outlines some recommendations ILRF believes are essential to address the above listed problems149.
Address Actors Actions
Precarious Labor Suppliers • Enter into formal employment contracts with factory workers, stitching center 
and home-based workers, and ensure all workers receive a formal appointment 
letter setting out the terms of their contract. 
• Ensure workers in less formal settings are provided the same salary and benefi ts 
accorded to permanent factory workers.
• Adopt a Code of Conduct and incorporate a clause prohibiting labor-only 
contracting arrangements or false apprenticeship schemes intended to avoid 
fulfi lling obligations to workers.
Buyers • Adopt a Code of Conduct and incorporate a clause prohibiting the use of informal 
labors throughout the entire supply chain and requiring mandatory registration of 
all workers after the probation period.  
• Establish long-term, stable supply contracts with supplier factories.
• Ensure that payment schedules are set out in all supply contracts and payments 
are made on time.
• Establish an optimum notice time for factories about changes in existing orders 
or placement of orders so that the factory is able to adjust production accordingly 
without violating hours of work standards or requiring the use of short-term 
contracts and subcontracting. Report publicly on the company’s policies for 
supplier/vendor selection, management, and/or termination.
• Release the list of global factories and stitching centers so as to make them 
publicly available.
• Set up an internal monitoring system and report publicly on auditing policies, 
mechanisms and results.  The auditing agenda shall include but not limit to the 
following topics: precarious contracts, wages, child labor, working hours, working 
environment and workers’ right to organize and bargain collectively.
Industry 
Associations
• Set up guidelines prohibiting casual labor in member companies and their supply 
chains.
• Initiate and support research and dialogue on current purchasing practices, the 
power relationship between buyers and suppliers and its impact on labor abuses.
Th e soccer ball industry’s 
organization of production, the 
unequal relationship between 
buyers and suppliers, and other 
factors have often negated even 
the best eﬀ orts to ﬁ x the endemic 
problems that continue to plague 
this industry. 
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Low Wages Suppliers • Incorporate a living wage clause in the Code of Conduct.
• Ensure the salary and benefi ts, which must be at least equal to the legal 
minimum wage, are clarifi ed and guaranteed in the formal appointment letters.
• Work with unions and NGOs to conduct internal auditing and report publicly 
on the auditing results. The auditing agenda shall include but not limit to the 
following topics: precarious contracts, wages, child labor, working hours, working 
environment and workers’ right to organize and bargain collectively.
Buyers • Incorporate a living wage clause in the Code of Conduct.
• Ensure that payment schedules are set out in supply contracts and that payments 
are made on time.
• Initiate and sponsor research on the current payment system to identify the 
impact of price mechanism on CSR compliance. 
• Report publicly on internal auditing policies, mechanism and results. 
Industry 
Associations
• Incorporate a clause in the Code of Conduct setting out a living wage standard.
• Initiate and support research and dialogue on current purchasing practices to 
determine whether prices paid to suppliers are suffi  cient to allow compliance with 
international labor standards and living wages.
Occupational Health and Safety 
Violations
Suppliers • Incorporate a health and safety standard in the Code of Conduct and ensure such 
standard meet the requirements as laid down in national labor laws as well as ILO 
Conventions.
• Provide occupational training to all workers at the beginning of their 
employment.
• Work with unions and NGOs to conduct internal auditing and report publicly on 
the auditing results. 
Buyers • Incorporate a health and safety standard in the Code of Conduct and ensure such 
standard meet the requirements as laid down in national labor laws as well as ILO 
Conventions.
• Report publicly on auditing policies and results. 
Industry 
Associations
• Incorporate a health and safety standard in the Code of Conduct.
• Initiate and support research and dialogue on current working environment 
across the industry and possible solutions. 
Limited Rights to Organize and 
Collective Bargain
Suppliers • Adopt a ‘Freedom of Association Policy’ and provide educational training to 
all workers in the factory, stitching centers and homes regarding unions and 
collective bargaining. 
• Establish an independent grievance process for workers to report substandard 
practices or violations.
Buyers • Adopt a ‘Freedom of Association Policy’ and audit to ensure the policy has been 
adopted and communicated to workers.
• Provide accessible and safe means by which workers can fi le complaints about 
labor rights violations to buyers, with a transparent process for solving complaints. 
Industry 
Associations
• Adopt a ‘Freedom of Association Policy’.
• Provide accessible and safe means by which workers can fi le complaints about 
labor rights violations, with a transparent process for solving complaints. 
To conclude, ILRF calls on the soccer ball industry, in coordination with our partners in India and Pakistan, to take 
immediate action to address the issues of extremely low wages and proliferation of temporary work schemes in order 
to improve conditions for the workers that produce the ball at the center of the World Cup 2010 games.
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